QUOTATIONS OF THE FAMOUS — AND NOT SO FAMOUS II

EXTRACTS FROM TABOO GENOCIDE                      BOOK II

“A battle royal is being waged for the mind and heart of the young peasant. Will he cling to the ‘Land and Liberty’ ideal of his parents and grandparents or will he firm himself into a socialistic system of agriculture. Will the peasant be happy as a cog in a great agricultural wheel, or will he always yearn for his little patch, his own cow, and freedom to buy and sell as he wishes? The next few decades will show.”

Gareth Jones, unsigned series, “The Real Russia”, The Times, London, Oct. 14-16, 1931

Among the general workers there is little of that faith in the future, which is so striking in the Communist. Disbelief in the newspapers and in propaganda is widespread. On being confronted by some figures showing that the Five-Years Plan was being completed in two and half years, one factory worker replied: ‘You cannot eat figures. The Five-Years Plan is on paper. You see that tree over there; it is no apple tree, is it? But the Communists say. “Tomorrow that tree has to grow apples”.’

Gareth Jones, unsigned series, “The Real Russia”, The Times, London, Oct. 14-16, 1931

This year 1931 Bill Bullitt writes Col. House from London and Europe, sending out feelers that he’s available if Roosevelt wins presidency. On December 1931, two years before the normalization of US-Soviet relations by Roosevelt, Bullitt informs House that he expects the Soviets “to concentrate on their internal reconstruction and ignore slaps from Japan, feeling sure that in ten years they will be strong enough to regain in the Far East anything they may now lose.” Already, signs of American economic assistance under President Hoover’s administration are proving successful. Bullitt agreed. “Literally everyone on the continent expects a development of dictatorships and state socialism, labeled Fascism or Communism, but essentially similar,” Bullitt writes House, and he adds, “Common sense and the spirit live and let live are momentarily conspicuous in their absence” making no sense at all, which was typical Bullitt. Nothing is said, nor even the slightest hint by Bullitt of terror or famine.

On January 19, 1932 from the White House Hoover announces that Charles Dawes has been chosen to head the Finance Reconstruction Corporation, “the new big corporation which has been created to restore the security and credit of the banks”. Dawes is an unpopular wedge in the State Department hierarchy. In order to settle the squabbling between his lower chiefs Stimson decides to lead the Arms Delegation at Geneva “in Dawes’ place”. That night for dinner Henry Breckenridge and his wife join Stimson along with the President and Mrs. Hoover. Other guests include “Ted” Roosevelt, newly appointed Governor to the Philippines, George Peter, Curtis Bok, Goldthwaite Dorr, Chief Justice Hughes, Bob Bliss, Ambassador to Argentina, and their wives. By mid-spring Hoover will totally astound Stimson with a proposition for the disarmament conference which must have appeared to the veteran statesman who served seven US presidents as the most incredible proposition ever in his long career. Poison gas, tanks, aircraft carriers, offensive airplanes – all of it were to be abolished and “all armies” reduced “by one-third”. Had Hoover fallen off his rocker?

 FEBRUARY 1932 – THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PACIFICATION ORDER

If they had bothered to check their compass course Stimson and the Consortium gang might have checked for deviations with their Comrade in the Kremlin. Stalin wasted no time. The start of an intense pacification of the Ukrainians has since the start of the new year. On January 3, 1932, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U) the top communist hierarchy debated Stalin and Molotov’s telegram ordering a merciless state procurement of Ukrainian grain. Stalin is well aware that over half of the grain needed to feed the USSR comes from the Ukraine and its rich black soil now covered with snow. Eighty-three senior-ranking officials are dispersed in great haste south throughout the Ukraine in order to organize the Party’s implementation of grain seizures and all the food they can get their hands on. By special resolution the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (CC AUCP) officially declared February 1932 the militant shock month to complete the USSR state grain seizures. This is no small decree. The whole nation is alerted. A terrible doom March and April 1932 falls upon village after village throughout the Ukraine as large numbers of starving people are subdued. Orphaned children roam the cities.

Reports continue to arrive at the State Department imploring for humanitarian assistance…

During the Holodomor and in general there is an odd complicity between journalists and diplomats. An exchange of favor can be quite the standard practice when serving the same masters of the ruling class. Its convenient to swop stories, pick up tips, trade info and of course share a good chat with a friend ready to fire home a story by cable or expedite by diplomatic pouch. Fellow Americans facing the same drama share different degrees of bewilderment or surprise not quite sure what world they are living in although in tragedy it may feel to be the same. Could it be that they both feel shock and awe, anger or sadness? Even in the marble stone halls of power one could never be too sure about anything real or solid. The journalist Stoneman “promised” to send the American ebmassy official Brodie his “impressions” after he returns to his base in Stockholm. For a moment they share a bond of horror and perhaps to remind them that a touch of compassion elevates life as human and dignified.

Around this time from London The New York Times reports March 28 that “N. M. Victor Rothschild , twenty-one-year-old nephew of Baron Rothschild is going to the United States soon to take a post with JP Morgan & Co. it was learned tonight.” The Times enlightens its readers that, “It is usual for progressive British bankers to send their young men to western states temporarily, one of the most notable believers in the practice being the Anglo-American banking house of J. Henry Schroeder & Co.” When seen from the historical perspective of the Rothschild relation with the Morgan firm Eustace Mullins reminds us (The World Order) this Morgan-Rothschild connection “explains the otherwise incomprehensible mystery of why JP Morgan famed as “the most powerful banker in the world”, yet who left such a modest fortune at his death in 1913, a mere $11 million ($110 million) after his debts were secured. Although the present members of the Morgan family seem financially secure, none of them is counted among the ‘big rich’.” The rich are very careful at matters of privacy; it would seem here the shadow over the legacy is greater than the man who leaves it behind. (E. Mullins, The World Order)

Consul Carlson on April 14 sends dispatch No. 14, a translation of an article from Balt Noewspaper Revalsche Zeitung, a German-language paper in Tallinn titled “Letter from Moscow” published April 8. The story covers “growing discontent in Russia at the living conditions”. Harry Carlson wants everyone to see this one. Copies of the story are passed on to Riga, Paris (EIC) and Washington. “A comparison of the situation of the average individual in the Soviet Union in the year 1928 with that of the present time shows that, although even at the beginning of the Five Year Plan the population had to suffer because of difficult living conditions, nevertheless the situation at that time appears to be almost paradisaical in comparison with that of today.” Moscow remained “an exception” where the populace received “their rations of bread with comparatively great regularity”. However, “the meat, milk, and butter provisioning of this city is completely disorganized” the privileged now could barely butter, and only rarely “fish, game and even poultry are offered for sale”. Moscow is not yet starving but it is living in great need.” (italics added)

Conditions for famine are stacking up State Department files. Carlson is experienced with famine and relief. He definitely is not happy with the Russian mess. This Tallinn story went on: “The situation in the country districts is entirely different. A steady flow of hungry people is under way towards Moscow. In all of the streets of Moscow typical peasant types are to be observed; there are men in Russian coats, whose feet are covered with felt boots and sometimes with rags. When these people are asked as to the places from whence they come they reply that they are from the districts of Orolow, Tula, or from Ryazan. They say that they are former ‘kulaks’ from whom everything has been taken and that they have come into the city in order not to starve in the country. In this way the population of Moscow increases daily and an army of unemployed is being formed the number of which is not to be estimated, and concerning which no statistics whatsoever are available.”

US observers watching Ukraine’s borders caught wind of a mass exodus of 1,000 Moldavian peasants from the Soviet Moldavian Republic into Rumania featured in dispatch No. 854 from Charles S. Wilson on March 12, 1932: “fleeing collectivization, and confiscation of the livestock and property, denied right to religious assembly and many sent to forced labor camps”. Conditions were desperate Charles Wilson note, and he writes, “Rather than continue to suffer such persecution, they preferred to run the risk of being shot by the Soviet guards during an attempted flight to Rumanian territory… The escape of 1,000 persons who will tell the truth about conditions in their own area is a bitter blow to the Soviets who had been broadcasting across the frontier glowing accounts of the Utopian conditions prevailing on the other side of the Dniester.” (SDDF 861.48/ Refugees 71/2, reel 31)

Bullitt travels to Moscow arriving May 21. His business ostensibly is debts and loans, credits for the Kremlin perhaps, but he has no special mission for Stalin. Stimson would never use him that way. Bullitt never shows any concern for the peasants on this trip. Famine and starvation are not his priorities. He is there ostensibly to intervene on behalf of negotiations for National City. More smoke and mirrors. It’s a Consortium deal and he’s only a bit player. He would fail. Stalin may have been a little curious but he has much more on his mind like losing the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Consortium still intended on making use of him. In two years a similar trick will turn on Bullitt when he has to take the full brunt of the President’s “gentleman’s agreement” with the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov when FDR puts the recognition deal on the table in the White House. All this would haunt Bullitt during his brief two years as as ambassador in Moscow completely exhausting the credit of his “Sovietphile” reputation making his presence there redundant and suddenly an all-too conspicuous embarrassment for Roosevelt bungling the Consortium’s long-term industrial business plans for Soviet rearmament and war. The reason for war is war. Peace begets peace; war begets war. Somehow that message eluded Bullitt who used up his valuable time in Moscow mainly in pointless debates with the expert dialectician Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim Litvinov to pay off National City’s Czarist debts.

But at this time in the early thirties more likely it is Colonel House, the shadowy presidential advisor and said to be a Rothschild man intervenes to move Bullitt a step closer to the apex. Power has no conscience; it knows and wants only more power and compels the actor to do what is necessary to take it, as much and whenever the occasion avails itself through people, events and situations. Consequently Bullitt arranges to be hired as a “Special Assistant” in Stimson’s State Department. It was a pure Consortium job, sending the famous Bolshevik apologist on a clandestine mission ostensibly to collect bad debts. The Consortium uses people like Bullitt until they are no longer needed. Stimson nor Hoover have no use for him. Stimson never liked him, considering him arrogant, a social gadfly flamboyantly disloyal and not a team player. In fact, when Bullitt gives his “club and donkey” speech and raised his warning against Stalin’s intention to turn Europe Red, Stimson becomes irate; FDR doesn’t agree with Bullitt’s method of diplomatic “cajolery and coercion”, declaring “it wouldn’t work” and that “The Soviets wouldn’t take it.” Stimson records in his diary “I realize what a preposterous thing it was for me to have my time taken up with this wretched, selfish, disloyal man’s troubles. He has gotten into this mess himself by virtually being disloyal to his chief.” The very experienced and very wealthy Bill Phillips (he married the Astor girl) has no place in his heart for Bullitt either. Hull had no opinion nor did his matter anyway. (M.Cassella-Blackburn, 215, HLS Diary)

Japanese aggression expands their hold on territory in China and tensions are high on the South Eastern Russian border with the Kremlin still holding onto territory around their railroad there. The Manchurian crisis was an episode of the vital importance for the League weakened by its failure to enforce international collective security agreements and treaties. Godfrey Hodgson writes, “It taught a lesson that was learned by the dictators before the democracies absorbed it: that only force could stop a nation or a leader who was willing to use force and use it ruthlessly. It showed beyond a doubt that the Japanese were determined to conquer China and such other territories as would give them the markets and the raw materials they believed they needed.” So far he has failed to restrain Japanese aggression in the Far East.

In a few short months in early September Stimson shares his vision for a future role of US in China with Admiral Hepburn, US Pacific Fleet Commander, to confront he says the “underlying danger in the Far East and the absolute necessity of keeping the Navy in such a condition in which it would be airtight against any sudden attack by the Japanese”. Stimson is now pitiless in his judgment of the League of Nations in general and the wretched political shuffling of the British appeasement clique, and Sir John Simon in particular. In private he said he was “disgusted”. Stimson calls the leaders of the League in general “damn mushy cowards”. He singled Simon out for “weasling”. Not a young man Stimson admits he has always felt a soldier at heart. When a world is preparing for war a lawyer not believing in the binding force of international treaties has nothing to gain in standing out as a paper tiger. (G. Hodgson, 167-8; HLS Diary)

Around this time Undersecretary Joe Cotton tells his close friend and boss Stimson “that a team of code-breakers in New York, picturesquely known as the “Black Chamber”, was deciphering and reading incoming messages for foreign ambassadors in Washington.” Stimson finds it dubious and blasphemously incredible that as early as the 1922 Naval Conference “the American delegates were presented every morning with the instructions sent to the British, French, Japanese and Italian delegates they were negotiating with. The code-breakers are controlled by the War Department’s Division of Military Information, but Stimson discovers to his consternation that the State Department had allotted $40,000 a year to Black Chamber, a huge sum when salaries are miniscule. That was in 1929 when Stimson shuts down the Cipher Bureau.

Stimson notes in his diary June 22, 1931 that the eves-dropping was “a highly unethical thing”, and he tries to end it. “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail”, declaring the practice underhanded and unclean and not suited to his profession as a lawyer and diplomat. Stimson cuts the funding. Black Chamber leader cryptanalyst Herbert O. Yardley is fired. Yardley then writes his whistle-blower book, The American Black Chamber, published that year 1931. It becomes an instant best-seller in Japan where its leaders learn how they had been “tricked” ten years before at the Naval Conference negotiations and duped into conceding naval superiority. The Japs change their codes. The US Army gets into the picture, setting up its own operations in the Signal Corps in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, and David Friedman, a brilliant emigrant Russian from Bessarabia whose parents escaped anti-Semitism there to settle in Pennsylvania, and changed his name to from Wolf to William. Friedman works with Yardley cracking the Japanese Purple cipher thus disclosing Japanese diplomatic secrets long knowing long before Pearl Harbor Japanese war plans. Among the new cryptanalysts Friedman is a legend; they all studied his book, Elements of Cryptanalysis, and regarded it as “our Bible”, expert codebreaker Joe Rochefort recalled. Friedman first learns about cryptography reading “The Gold Bug”, by Edgar Allan Poe, my favorite writer when I was ten. Just imagine that, a penniless and persecuted emigrant Russian Jew saves America. And he never got the Medal of Freedom. (M. Bundy, On Active Service, 188; G. Hodgson, The Colonel, 203; Shawn J. Rosenheim, The Cryptographic Imagination Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1997,11; Ronald W. Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple: the Life of Colonel William F. Friedman, Who Deciphered the Japanese Code in World War II, Boston: Little Brown, 1997; David Kahn, The Codebreakers: the Story of Secret Writing. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966; Frank B. Rowlett, The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer, Aegean Park Press, 1999; P. K O’Donnell writes Hoover and Stimson received Black Chamber intercepts in 1929 provoking the shutdown, and he adds, “Fortunately, the military pressed on with code-breaking efforts.” , xi ; re “Black Chamber” W. Friedman, Elliott Carlson, Joe Rochefort’s War, The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011, 55; Leo Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide, A Codemaker’s War 1941-1945, NY: The Free Press/Simon & Schuster, 1998)

Let us, reader, take a quick look at the distinguished Mr. Gilbert: Seymour Parker Gilbert (1892-38), banker, lawyer, politician, diplomat, all the right ingredients for the Consortium. Rutgers, Harvard Law; at 27, Gilbert lands a top slot as undersecretary at Treasury in Wilson’s administration during the first years of the Fed under McAdoo and stays on during the war years and Harding’s administration. Gilbert was deep into the postwar reconstruction of Germany as Agent General for Reparations to Germany (1924-30) and appointed by the Allied Reparations Commission, succeeding Owen D. Young. The Young Plan originally conceived the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Gilbert had been responsible for implementing the doomed Dawes Plan which bought Germany to its knees compelling Hoover to impose his moratorium on debts and reparations and driving the German people over the brink and Hitler into power. Rewarding all he has done taking the world closer to what author Ian Buruma describes in Year Zero 1945 (2013) as the worst conflict in the history of the world, by 1931 Gilbert officially makes partner at JP Morgan; during the yuppie 1980s of arbitrage mega-mergers Gilbert’s son chairs Morgan Stanley. A quaint sense of continuity of the victors, reader, is it not so? (Ian Buruma, Year Zero 1945: A History of 1945, NY: Penguin Press, 2013)

June 8. On the position of cancellation of war debts by the British Treasury (“Atherton’s talk with Sir Warren Fischer”) Hoover tells Stimson “that he could not be expected after he was spending every day in turning down hundreds of requests from Congress to appropriate various sums of money for Americans to turn around and give away $250,000,000 a year to foreigners. The American people simply could not understand it.” Hoover said the Europeans could pay. How much? “Perhaps the whole”, he said. June 28, Tom Lamont of Morgan calls Stimson to tell him “in both Argentina and Germany the British were urging the respective countries to default on their sinking fund payments on the long term bonds.” Stimson notes “This is contrary to the policy of JP Morgan & Co., who always urge that government bonds take precedence over private indebtedness.” The British worry they’d might default “on their private obligations” ;Lamont tells Stimson “the British were doing it in good faith as the lesser evil”. Lamont urges Stimson to push Hoover “to take the lead again.” On June 29 Stimson notes in his diary, “The President said that the financial situation had gotten as bad as it possible could be. Hoarding has begun again and some $200,000,000 is being withdrawn from circulation every week. That is equal to the very peak of the bad times last fall. … Roosevelt is very likely now to be the nominee…” The tide has turned against Hoover. (HLS Diary)

The economist and former Tsarist prisoner is at a complete loss where to turn for help. And who might help? What on earth could possibly be done to prevent further devastation? He asked the right questions but dares not antagonize the Americans. “Whence can help be expected? It might be expected from every nation inspired by reason and charity – especially from kindred Slavs and from Yugoslavia where I write these lines. One might expect help from the League of Nations, although the latter is still feeble and rather slow in action, whereas distress cannot wait. Someone MUST begin however, someone must show immediate efficiency, and make others follow. This initiative belongs to the great American people.”

“The severe economic crisis that reigns now in the United States can in no way (sic) hinder giving aid to starving Russia. On the other hand, having experienced herself what calamity means, America will more readily sympathize with the plight Russia is in. On the other – the American crisis does not spell impoverishment, rather superproduction of every kind and in particular of food stuff. It would therefore not be too difficult to send aid, which would certainly be useful in respect of the moral and political authority and future economic perspectives of the United States.”

British diplomats receive more alarming reports which arrive more frequently at the embassy in Moscow. Secret police whom the Brits call “minders” tail foreigners and diplomats around every corner, hotel and favorite restaurant recording their contacts with soviet citizens. Writer Michael Hughes in Inside the Enigma: British officials in Russia, 1900-1939 (2003) tells of a week tour in the Ukraine in July 1932 by the observer Vyvyan “who was surprised by the apparent health of the local population in an area supposedly ravaged by famine until walking unchaperoned through the streets of Rostov he saw ‘two men lying on the streets – their faces covered with flies’. None of the passers-by took any notice of them, a tell-tale sign that death from malnutrition and disease had become so common in the region that it was no longer a cause for any comment or concern. In another town, Vyvyan watched as a passer-by eagerly scraped out the contents of an old sardine tin into which some used tea-leaves had been emptied.” (M. Hughes, Inside the Enigma: British officials in Russia, 1900-1939, Manchester University Press, 2003, 236; FO 371/16339, “Report on a Week’s Tour in the Crimea and Ukraine” by Vyvyan, enclosed with Lord Strang to Sir Esmond Ovey, Aug. 1 1932)

 

Andrew J. Williams (Trading with the Bolsheviks, 1920-1939) is a slick writer playing “the Game” of politicians, bankers and diplomats. His ploy adept in rhetoric, that specious art of speaking with signs and multilayered nuance is compelling at a glimpse. Yet here is just another academic out to do his bit to baffle and confuse a clear reading of a truncated historical record. Still his focus on trade, business and grain deals with the Bolsheviks is worth the read yet he scantly refers to the Great Dictator as though Stalin was too insignificant a common rogue in the empire world abounding with Lords, Barons, and Viscounts. Instead s scurrilous banter and nonsense of falsehoods mixed with salient diplomatic files on serious issues is passed off at an attempt at scholarship, another shrewd deception to earn possible tenure but no knighthood. Kent Professor Andrew Williams ignores Sutton’s three volumes researched at the Hoover Institute at Stanford. In a chapter titled “The US and Russia, 1928-1935”, the professor takes the extraordinary but traditionally corrupt path of denial for both American presidents Hoover and Roosevelt of their responsibility for making and executing the policy adopted and orchestrated through Stalin’s Five-Year Plans. Instead, in order to play safe and align himself with the Foreign Office version of the FDR Consortium gang’s portrayal of how things were perceived at the time, and so, likewise, to parallel academic reflection with the administration’s political expediency of the era, Williams promotes Hull, a front, and Kelley, a low-level scapegoat without wealth or political connections in the State Department bureaucracy to a role and importance they never had. At least we can see here how the establishment historians persist in falsifying the Holodomor history. Here, for example, here professor Williams fabricates an insipid misleading piece of academic gibberish passed off as serious scholarship writing, “where Hoover was able to devote attention as Secretary of Commerce to Russia and many other things, both Roosevelt and, for half of his term, Hoover, were forced to concentrate on the unfolding domestic disaster. Although Roosevelt did have a far more ‘internationalist’ line-up in the State Department, he nonetheless pursued an unremittingly nationalist foreign policy for the first few years of his Presidency. Russia was largely left, as it had been under all presidents since Wilson, to key members of the President’s cabinets after 1929… Cordell Hull and his top officials, especially in Bob Kelley’s Eastern European Department, and the personnel based in Moscow, especially William C. Bullitt and Joseph Davies, become the key American policy makers.” Total flapdoddle. As we know these guys don’t make “policy”. William’s specious comment on Bullitt and Davies is equally absurd and should trigger immediate suspicion of his intent. Genuine rot. But this is sort of treatment we find too often by skilled technicians of rhetoric taught to deceive the ignorant in tedious time-consuming diversions of trivial pursuit. Reader beware a blend of chaff. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 151-2)

Apart from saying little about the intricate activities of the Consortium Anglo agenda shared with the Americans, professor Andrew Williams does float some useful and documented material on trade and grain issues situated in the context of Empire politics which culminates in the annual international wheat conference held in Ottawa, Canada in mid-summer 1932. Having failed to deal openly with the famine crisis in 1932, he cites Russia as having “enjoyed a large trade surplus in 1930 and 1931” with the US. He added, however, that as hard economic times were met with rising American trade barriers, namely that because of the Smoot-Hawley in 1930 “in the circumstances of the passing of the Tariff Act and the wildest charges of ‘dumping’ and ‘slave labour’ it would have been surprising if Hoover’s administration had not taken some moves against Russian trade.” Rather, it would have been “surprising” if he had, and certainly not during the Plans. Nor is there any serious Congressional outcry against Stalin. State terror and the Soviet gulag system merit no treatment by the British professor as it did little for Hoover, as Williams writes, “whose Cabinet saw some tightening of the rules as they applied to Russia as not ‘include(ing) any new or broad questions’, but the implementation of them created a great deal of controversy. In particular, the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture but not, it should be noted, the Department of Commerce, put steps in motion to investigate the accusations of slave labour and dumping, similar to those leveled in Britain and France.” (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 155)

“In 1929,” Williams writes, “Russian exports of lumber (boards. Etc.) to the United States amounted to less than one per cent of US imports and less than one-tenth of a percent of domestic consumption. Imports of Soviet pulpwood stood at 11 percent of American imports. The Treasury ruled on 8 July 1930 that this was not produced by convict labor, then changed its mind on 25 July with an embargo, only to remove it again 1 August.” Even in the muddle Williams doesn’t find anything odd with that, and instead ignores the issues it raises over complicity with the Soviet Terror Gulag.

The US State Department, however, is concerned. So is the politically ambitious Henry Fletcher, Hoover’s appointee to chair the US Tariff Commission (1930-31) and currently chairman of the Republican National Committee. Today Fletcher is an icon of spotless reputation with his name carved in stone on the Fletcher School of Diplomacy in Massachusetts. About this brother of the Consortium readers of Time were told in the September 1, 1930 issue that Fletcher who seemed to appear on the American scene from nowhere had begun his ascendancy as a former “private in Roosevelt’s Rough Riders (1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry) during the Spanish War (who sic) was not mentioned at the White House last week as one of the official reasons why President Hoover appointed him chairman of the new Tariff Commission”; five years later this Republican stalwart unsuccessfully leads his party to dethrone Roosevelt in the White House. And who exactly is Henry Prather Fletcher (1873-59) who layed to rest eternally in Arlington National Cemetery normally reserved for military men of distinction? According to writer Gerard Colby (DuPont Dynasty), GOP chairman (1934-36) Fletcher received “over $35,000 in DuPont family donations” in 1934. This during late 1934 and 1935 with US Senate munitions hearings casting the public spotlight on Consortium-Nazi connection including the DuPont ammo deals with German companies. None of that tarnished Fletcher and his gang whose priority is to protect their money sources. The Senate hearings reveal that DuPonts ranked in over $250 million in profits of the carnage of the First World War. Colby observes, however, that “even here, the DuPonts were not unique. Other American companies had also done business with the Nazi regime. United Aircraft Corporation, for example, sold twenty-nine airplane engines to Hitler in 1933, increasing their German business from $6,000 in 1932 to $272,000; by 1934 the figure was $1,445,000.* Curtis-Wright, Douglas Aircraft, and Sperry Gyroscope all provided airplane equipment easily adaptable to wartime use. And General Electric, Alcoa, and Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) all maintained patent agreements with companies of Germany… Indeed, the crimes of the DuPonts could only be described as the crimes of private enterprise itself, and, such being the case, the DuPonts remained immune from federal prosecution, for their ethics presumed certain basic principles of political economy shared by everyone in Washington, including those in the White House.” It was left to Bonesman Henry Luce and his editors at Time to bring the cultivated university educated elite up to date on this Consortium politics. Although Fletcher lacks the Ivy League pedigree so keen to Luce, Time spotlights his obscure military background. It’s just another stitch to the Roosevelt legend of the battle to take San Juan Hill precipitating the flight of the Spanish navy from Santiago in the Spanish-American War. Fletcher enlists in the 40th US Infantry deployed in a massive occupational force to seize the Philippines from the Spanish and smash the nationalist drive for independence. (*The 1933 dollar value was before FDR’s devaluation approximately slightly less than one-tenth of the 1990 dollar value; G. Colby, DuPont Dynasty, 1974,1984 ed., 324)

Fletcher is part of a Stimson’s tightly-knit group of Consortium friends that includes Bill Phillips, Basil Miles, Willard Straight, Gen. Frank McCoy of Stimson’s 1932 Manchurian Commission named for British diplomat V. A. G. R. Bulwer-Lytton, the 2nd Earl of Lytton. After meeting with government leaders in China and Japan in 1932 this group spends six weeks in Manchuria on a fact-finding mission in the spring. Their report condemns the Japanese aggression and occupation. Efforts to cool the burning embers have the reverse effect. Just over a year has passed since the plot of a radical ultra-nationalist group called the Cherry Blossom Society failed in their plot to overthrow the civilian government. Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot in the Tokyo railroad station. This year a group of young military officers called the Blood Brotherhood kill Finance Minister Kaoru Inoue and Baron Dan, head of Mitzui, the largest zaibatsu. Then, on May 15 Prime Minister Inukai considered anti-militarist and an advocate of peace negotiations with China is murdered in his government residence by assassins shooting down government guards. That day several attacks failed including an attempt to bomb the Mitsubishi Bank, slay Count Makino and bomb the headquarters of the Tokyo police. Clans and cliques fought over what faction would ultimately dominate the sacred Imperial Palace and its hostage Emperor. “The young officers did not want total war. ‘It is obvious,’ said one of them, ‘that Japan’s relations with Russia, China, Britain and the United States are now so strained that any careless step on Japan’s part may throw our divine country into the abyss of war and annihilation,” the Seagraves write. (S. Seagrave and P. Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty, 148)

The Seagraves describe conditions at the time: “The only real opposition to the Manchurian takeover came from Chinese citizens who boycotted Japanese exports, which fell an average of 90 percent in 1932. In Chinese cities, Japanese were beaten up or murdered. In Shanghai, portraits of Hirohito were paraded with paper daggers stuck through his heart. Here was an opportunity not to be missed. Japanese provocateurs posing as Buddhist monks provoked a quarrel with a Shanghai mob and two ‘monks’ were slain. At the time Japan’s navy was responsible for policing her commercial interests in Shanghai and there were a number of well-armed Japanese vessels in the Whangpo river. Knowing that reinforcements were already on the way, the Japanese admiral in Shanghai dispatched his marines and mobilized some of the city’s 30,000 Japanese residents. Immediately fighting broke out with the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army in Shanghai. Random gunshots were succeeded by artillery barrages and aircraft strafing and bombing runs. Large parts of the city were flattened. Thousands of Westerners watched the carnage from the relative safety of the International Settlement, so where Japan’s unseen actions in Manchuria had been applauded, its conspicuous brutalities in Shanghai were denounced. Tom Lamont lamented that the Japanese blunder (the blunder of being observed) would make it ‘impossible to arrange any (further) credit (for Tokyo), either through investment of banking circles’.” And that spring on March 27, 1933 Japan pulls out of the League of Nations taking another great step towards an inevitable and epic clash and realignment with Consortium global strategy. (S. Seagrave and P. Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty, 145-6)

Miles, only 51 when he died in 1928, had been for the last six years the American Administrative Commissioner to the International Chamber of Commerce, a high-level position since his 1917 Bolshevik coup days in Petrograd with William Franklin Sands, a director of the New York Federal Reserve who sent a million dollars to the Bols. As the State Department’s chief Russian specialist Miles, he and his group advised US ambassador Francis how to “deal with all authorities in Russia including Bolsheviks”. (Sands had also intervened to help John Reed.) Sutton observes, “… Basil Miles, in charge of the Russian desk at the State Department and a former associate of William Franklin Sands, was decidedly helpful to the businessmen promoting Bolshevik causes; but in 1923 the same Miles authored a pro-fascist article, “Italy’s Black Shirts and Business”. Miles declares, “Success of the Fascists is an expression of Italy’s youth”. Miles sees in the fascist movement a bold new opportunity for the American Consortium gang. (A. C. Sutton, “Alliance of Bankers and Revolution”, Wall Street and the Bolsheviks)

One little story Luce and Time will not divulge is the saga of 1718 H Street in Washington. There “the Family” hang out in a smart little DC townhouse reserved for a tightly-knit set of top hotshot Consortium diplomats. It began in 1907 the best and the brightest moving up fast at State rented the home of retired Army General William H. Emery. Some time after Basil Miles (Oxford) is assigned to Petrograd, in 1914, they decide to buy “1718” to ensure a cornerstone residence for “the Family,” actually a very private men’s hideaway. Other members of the “1718” club include Bill Phillips, Willard Straight, and Norman Davis, the sugar magnate who organizes the Trust Company of Cuba and a wartime adviser to Treasury on foreign loans and an Armistice delegate; Boston Mayor Andrew J. Peters; New York Fed Governor Benjamin Strong, Undersecretary David K. E. Bruce, scion of a distinguished line of Virginians including Patrick Henry (Princeton). In 1926 Bruce marries his first wife Ailsa Mellon, daughter of Andrew W. Mellon and the richest woman in America, more rich even than the Harriman women. During the war Bruce joins Bill Phillips in the OSS and listed to head the newly formed CIA. Instead he got ambassadorships at Paris (1949-52), Berlin (1957-59), and London (1961-69). During the Vietnam Peace Talks Bruce follows Lodge as US envoy to Paris.

To crown his achievements as often happens with the Consortium top cadre, David K. E. Bruce served two years as US ambassador to NATO (1975-76); Undersecretary Joseph C. Grew, later ambassador to Japan; Leland Harrison (Eton and Harvard ’07); Frederick Sterling (Harvard ’98); undersecretary and NY lawyer, Joseph Cotton, James C. Dunn, and Francis White. Between missions Norman Armour is another regular showing up at 1718 H Street bringing his friends from St. Pauls, Princeton ‘09, Harvard Law ‘13. During the Russian Revolution Armour was a junior officer in the US embassy; in the tumult he helped Princess Myra Koudacheff escape from the Bols and married her. Parties at 1718 H Street inevitably includes the Roosevelts, no strangers to this crowd. As most members are married house rules are set to allow for a spirited and proper longevity of all-male “The Family” while preserving the residence as an all-male “club for the social elite of the Diplomatic Service”. And it’s strictly off-limits to pressmen.

 

THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT MARKET: UK IMPORTS UKRAINIAN WHEAT

Kent University professor Andrew Williams did concur, however, that there was something entirely incongruous in the historical record of the mighty shadow cast by an all too cumbersome Russian debt problem that apparently preoccupied Kelley and Bullitt. Historian Andrew Williams does well to show its utter superficiality, in fact, its irrelevance. In terms of holding any serious weight as an obtrusive government debt owed the United States, it counts for nothing except for calling into question the positioning of National City determined to leverage the Czarist debt and tie up the conundrum of US-Soviet relations.

What a bluff in the name of patriotism and honor! It’s not exactly clear if the funds owed City were a private or government debt. As it turns out Roosevelt could care less about City, or ever seeing the money again. His “Game” was for the long haul and keeping the bankers happy while getting over short-term obstacles, politically. Roosevelt was a rotten banker, and knew next to nothing about monetary policy, but not unlike his counterpart in the Kremlin thrived at winning on the great chessboard of power politics. In a section titled “Soviet indebtedness to the United States, 1917-1933”, Williams calculated in real terms the Russian-US debt, writing “The American Government was nowhere near as financially embarrassed by the Bolshevik Revolution as were its Allies.” Once that is understood, in the context of Czarist alliance with London and Paris in the Great War against Germany, with four years of bloody stalemate and the Allies supplied and financed by Morgan, its clear that America was dealt a royal flush. US Ambassador Francis in Petrograd estimated America’s loans to Czarist Russia at $187 million “to which had to be added the credit of $100 million agreed on 23 August 1917 and a further $75 million dollars to pay the Russian army and navy, figures which seem to have been accepted as broadly accurate as late as 1933”. Not quite so. Well, not exactly.

The Soviets immediately renounce and reject claims to repay the Kerensky funds once they had been disbursed. Williams added, “In a memo to Colonel House in Paris in February 1919 to prepare him for the forthcoming discussions with the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo, the Treasury put the ‘direct interest’ of the United States Government at ‘approximately $190,000,000 in the Russian situation’… The Treasury was quite aware of the unusual political implications of the debt crisis with Russia and most worried lest the Allies not show a united face in dealing with it.” Once the Allies and Germany defaulted on war debts, in the depressed economic environment after 1929, the debt repayment was not going to happen. (Andrew J. Williams, “Soviet indebtedness to the United States, 1917-1933”, “The USA and Russia, 1920-1932”, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 21)

And Andrew Williams looked more closely into the problem of “individual US investors who risked losing a lot of money. This problem was immediately highlighted by the need to pay the coupons on $50,000,000 of bonds held by the National City Bank of New York (then the biggest bank in the US) due 10 January 1919.” The State Department then waives payments of interest on outstanding bonds as not “advisable”. Further, the sum owed private individuals was unclear. A story appearing early February 1934 in the NY Times accounted for a thousand claims totaling $337,223,288 representing such Consortium capitalist giants as Westinghouse, International Harvester, Singer Sewing Machine Company, Equitable Life Assurance, Standard Oil, Vacuum Oil, Otis Elevator.

Much later in June 1939 Morgenthau submits to Hull a revised account for $223 million “considered a liberal estimate of the amount of justified claims”, with the nominal 5% interest inexplicably waived ($216 million in bank deposits nationalized by the Bols, $104 million in confiscated American property, and $86 million in Czarist Imperial war bonds of which only half were accepted by the Kremlin. Then Williams helps us sort out the jumble that kept Bullitt tied up in knots during his entire stay in Moscow. Williams concludes that the claims of the Americans were preposterously unreal: “firstly, the absolute debt totals, private or public, were quite low. If a dollar/sterling exchange rate (in 1992 sic) were of $4.86 to the pound (all figures rounded up) were used the total public debt owed to America by the Soviet Union was only about £39,712,000, with private debt at either £91,975,000 (higher estimate) or £39,712,000 (lower estimate). Secondly, the comparative debt totals with Britain and France are quite disproportionately in America’s favour; British and French Government and private debt totals, using the figures accepted by US Treasury, came out at (Britain) £567,983,396 (public) and £66,627,000 (private) and (France) francs at .20 to the dollar) $185,750,000 (public) and $996,550,000 (private). Thirdly, if account is also taken of the much greater population of the USA (at 91,000,000, 1910 Census) and its greater GNP, it is clear that the direct electoral importance of Russian debt was bound to be less in America than either Britain or France, and especially in the latter. However, it never proved to be this way in practice.”

Then the strangest thing of all happened, or was it. The largely irrelevant American debt became the thorn behind the Kremlin, at least so it appeared, while in reality the Americans in the Consortium continued business as usual with its economic program backing Stalin’s Five-Year Plans. With his rhetorical flair for subtlety in fine British tradition, Williams comes to the same conclusion, writing, “ Rather than making the American Government more keen to arrive at a settlement with Soviet Russia it made them more intransigent. The Russian debt question was to become mixed up with other, intra-Allied, debt problems. But many Americans saw Soviet non-payment of Czarist debts as symbolic of the problems of dealing with a renegade state that might once again refuse to pay its debts, and an affront to the principles of contract and decent business practice.” Did you get that, reader? “…contract and decent business practice”?

With billions swept away from investors on Wall Street as the country faces 30 per cent unemployment and the Consortium “banksters” nervously study the ticker-tape while the bankrupt nation falls over the brink, who’s talking? Figures for pre-1929 trade put forward by Prof. Williams found that US Commerce Department records reveal US exports to Russia running at $41.98 million (1924) rising to over $68.87 million (1925), $49.74 million (1926) and $58.81 million for the first ten months 1927, and $63.6 million for the year rising to 72.5 million (1928). For the period 1927-28, US imports from Russia rose slightly less than ten per cent to $14 million. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 22-3, 42-6; re. Amtorg financing in F. Kellogg to A. W. Kliefoth, Riga May 3 1929, in file 711.61/15; No. 359 and Coleman in Riga to F. Kellogg, Feb. 13, 1928, file 661.1115/13; R. Kelley to P. Mellon, March 10, 1928, and reply Aug. 2, 1928, 661.1115/14 and 15; The NYT, Feb. 7, 1934)

THE CAIRNS REPORT & CANADIAN GRAIN EXPORTS

Meet Dr. Andrew Cairns. He’s played no small part in the incredible Holodomor tragedy. So why then has he remained virtually ignored by writers, historians and researchers although his eye-witness accounts of the Terror-Famine reached the highest level at the British Foreign Office and Downing Street? Dr. Cairns is a dedicated agriculture expert born in Scotland who took his degrees in Canada at the University of Alberta earning him in 1923 a gold medal in agriculture; advanced studies lead to a Bachelor of Science degree at the University of Minnesota. Eight years later, in 1931, Cairns is director of the grain department of the Empire Marketing Board (London) in charge of developing a data intelligence division. Largely for proving particularly talented and useful and for having kept his silence about the famine, Cairns is promoted, in 1934, to Permanent Secretary of the World Wheat Advisory Commission (London). By the time he is appointed Secretary of the Washington Wheat Conference (1941-42) Cairns becomes increasing troubled by what he saw and remained glum and argumentative when later working for the US government to help fight starvation caused by that war, and working under Herbert H. Lehman as director of food for UNFAA, an official UN employee of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Secretary-general of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. Cairns’ career abruptly ends in an airplane accident outside New Delhi in 1958. (Allan Nevins, Herbert H. Lehman and his Era, NY: Scribners,1963; Andrew Cairns, The Soviet Famine, 1932-33: An Eyewitness Account of Conditions in the Spring and Summer of 1932, Research Report No. 35, xxvii, 122 ed. Tony Kuz, Edmonton, 1989; re. Cairns Russian Wheat Report, <www.utoronto.ca/cius/publications/rr/rr35.html>; Sir John Latham, Papers, National Library Australia Series 54, Minister for External Affairs, 1932-34, contains correspondence (Feb. 1932-Oct. 1934), and three reports by Andrew Cairns to the Empire Marketing Board on his travels in Western Siberia, the Volga region, Ukraine, Crimea and Caucasus in June-Aug. 1932, and a report of a visit by Capt. H. J. Feakes to China and Japan in July 1933; “A Question of Betrayal, the Anglo-American Powers and the Ukrainian Question”, Ukraine Today, perspectives for the future, ed. Halyna Koscharsky, Commack, NY: Nova Science, 1995)

Andrew J. Williams, a British subject and a lecturer in international relations at the University of Kent at Canterbury summarizes his findings concerning Soviet wheat exports during the Genocidal years of the Holodomor. The neat rendition is ripe with interesting and very important details that might otherwise pass without much concern in view of the delicate complexity of Anglo cabinet politics at the time of Bolshevik trade with its principal partners France, England, Germany and the United States. Yet we see through citations from rare diplomatic sources including FO Secretary Sir John Simon, Secretary Lord William Strang and Ambassador Sir Esmond Ovey in Moscow that no matter how fundamentally flawed, Empire trade with the Russians shadowed as it were by a pitfall of false conclusions pertaining to elements of strategic interest central to the Holodomor in the end fail to attribute cabinet politics much importance from which it remains oddly aloof. Yet with the Williams account we find demonstrably remarkable by its absence not even the slightest reference to Russian famine which if and when seriously considered had no serious consequences whatsoever for the Empire though significantly affecting the international wheat market within the calculations of Great Britain’s trade balance. Not only at stake here is Great Britain’s rapidly declining world rank and prestige as well as its complete dependence on agricultural imports and, in particular grain and timber. Odd that Williams should add (in a cursory footnote) a fact most pertinent but neglected by Holodomor writers that “Britain was also Canada’s biggest commodity export market, especially for wheat…”

Russian grain and wheat are not negligible commodities for either London or Washington. In 1932 Great Britain is the largest market for wheat imports in the world and there was no finer wheat than produced by the rich black earth of the Ukraine where wheat has been for centuries literally the source of life as well as for half of all the USSR with valuable hidden grain reserves for the Red Army. That the Ottawa Empire Conference came at a time when millions of people are starving under intensified repression and terror by London’s trade partner with rumours of Russian ‘dumping’ in the press only complicated the task of sorting out the agenda. Only Great Britain appears not to have had one.

“The Cabinet minutes record”, wheat expert A. J. Williams observes, “that ‘no decisions have been taken on any of the controversial points that might be raised.” A political crisis nearly toppled Ramsay MacDonald’s shaky coalition government; in August 1932 Christopher Addison, (1869-51), the British minister of Agriculture resigns charging that the government was victim to a “bankers’ ramp”, out-foxed by the Bank of England. Later the Leader of the House of Lords 1st Viscount Addison KG, PC, himself a prominent doctor, Fellow of the Royal Surgeons, and a liberal socialist politician plucked from his national efforts to care for England’s neglected children to serve during the Great War in Lloyd George’s cabinet as minister of Munitions and then Minister of Health, alas, he too, will do nothing to raise a finger to help Ukraine. In December, at Geneva, Sir John Simon attracted more opprobrium when he failed to condemn Japanese incursions in their invasion of Manchuria. No matter. In the next year of the 1933 Holodomor his second wife Kathleen R. Harvey, the Viscountess Simon, enjoys the grand honor as a Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire. Sir John is also a fellow of All Souls* (1897) and was called to the bar at the Inner Temple,in 1899. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 215, ft. note, 48, CAB 23/72, Minutes of 12 July 1932; Gordon T. Stewart, “An Objective of US Foreign Policy since the Founding of the Republic”, Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Phillip Buckner, UBC Press, 2005, 100-101; *All Souls College: “The Warden and College of the Souls of all Faithful People deceased in the University of Oxford; Unique to All Souls members become Fellows entitling status as full members of the College’s governing body. With an endowment of £236 million (2007) All Souls is one of the wealthiest colleges. It was founded in 1438 by Henry VI of England and Henry Chichhele, fellow of New College and Archbishop of Canterbury. Presently it is primarily an academic research institution. Members included Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, thrice Prime Minister, and T. E. Lawrence of Lawrence of Arabia fame.)

EMPIRES COME AND GO, BUT THE ROTHSCHILDS REMAIN ROTHSCHILDS…

For men of conscience it could not have been a pleasant thought, if indeed a thought had occurred, as it were, that this should be a policy of doing nothing while appearing to govern with moral and civil restraint. But these are the men and politics of Empire. It is what it is and that is what it was. Empires come and go but the Rothschilds remain Rothschilds. For the British MPs MacDonald’s ministers faced with the ills of Depression and its own internal banking crisis prepared the field with political dynamite. To imagine the general population in the capital of the King’s Empire blithely munching their breakfast cereals and buttering their bread baked when the people are falling down dead by the millions from starvation does not bode well for the cherished sanctity of moral grace. That might make them grind their teeth on their smoking pipe. But diplomats are not priests. They have offices to protect. Such men don’t take kindly to falling off their horse, without a servant to push them back in the saddle.

Williams refers to “the diplomatic breach of 1927, since when the Conservatives had tried to ignore Russia.” In addition to the official political hostility which prevailed, there also existed strong reservations in the City concerning any extension of financial credits to a state which had reneged on the debts of its Czarist predecessor… The main support for greater ties had proved, ironically, to come from industrial concerns for Britain (particularly in the engineering sector, which had suffered most from increased competition in its export markets since 1918), and from major importers of raw materials, particularly of wheat, timber, and oil products. Britain was the world’s premier importer of wheat and timber in the inter-war period.” Prof. Williams adds, “Britain was also Canada’s biggest commodity export market, especially for wheat…” (A. J. Williams, “The imperial factor and Anglo-Soviet relations, 1929-35, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 185; op cit. 212 note 2).

With a broad-stroke of falsification causes and manipulations of the First World War once again strike a stake in the heart of an accurate and relevant account as establishment authors of mass media apply their dark trade of systemic distortion to deceive the democratic voting masses. Here in the world perceived through the prism of Kent University professor Andrew Williams geopolitical affairs of the First World War, Russian Revolution and Allied trade relations are reduced to random events and separate events of a chaotic and unpredictable nature where inept and selfless leaders tumble and fall about in the halls of power bungling uncoordinated and divergent national interests without a common thread which bonds them to any oligarchic national group or international organization beyond the aristocratic eccentricities of their ingrained ruling class Empire. Salient facts are mixed with clever distortions neatly tailored and garnished. It rings of saber-sharp distinction of the Cadogan class where arrogance renders courage harmfully incompetent. Williams is not unlike his fellow Brit the informer Robert Conquest, or Chicago University’s Katherine Siegel joining the proud rank of establishment distortionists placed in academic positions. It is particularly nauseating to read bad history or disinformation when with unabashed confidence it is presented that his view is clear and his course sure while dishing out a voodoo assessment of a historical record which Williams insists the reader “must” swallow such as a sick patent takes the knowing doctor’s medicine. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 1992)

Andrew Williams twists and turns history into strange angles of perspective and here gets much considerably not right. Nevertheless, as is typically the fashion of fact-ridden fantasists, Williams does bring to light curious documents such as details of Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s intrigues with the Russians at Genoa in 1922, or the visit in the summer of 1932 of Andrew Cairns of the Empire Marketing Board to Russia, found in Ramsay MacDonald’s papers at Kew, and in the London School of Economics archives of E. M. H. Lloyd, a ranking civil servant. One can imagine what he might have to say if anything at all about the Holodomor: “terrible mess, that”. “Most unfortunate business.” “Hard to believe it really happened at all”. “As bad as that, was it, really?” And so on with the corrupted pundits of fiction skilled in rhetoric and constitutional law. Such enemies of the truth who pose as truth-bearers ought to be purged from the profession. But they are paid too well for their complicity in the crime, each year a new crop from Oxford and Cambridge, plentiful and useful to the Consortium from generation to generation. Edward M. Hastings Lloyd was the author of Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940-45, published by Cambridge University in conjunction with the University of Chicago, and The Food Research Institute of Stanford (1956).

THE STRANGE BUT TRUE REVELATIONS OF COMMANDER GUY CARR

But there are others who write of the calamity of the miscarriage of justice. A former submarine commander and author of Pawns in the Game (1958) Guy Carr doggedly pursues this murky mystery with the passionate determination of an officer of His Majesty’s Service peering into a subterranean saga. For over a half-century before the 2008 financial debacle during the Bush administration Carr tracks the malicious path taken by the Consortium money men up leading to the 1929 Wall Street. “Then, after speculative investments had just about reached their peak,” Carr notes, “vast amounts of money were withdrawn from circulation. Credits were restricted. Calls were made on loans. In 1922-25 a minor depression was experienced. This economic juggling was a preliminary experiment before the Powers-That-Be brought about the great depression of 1930. After 1925 financial policy was reversed and conditions steadily improved until prosperity in America, Britain, Canada, and Australia, reached an all-time record. Speculation in stocks and bonds and real estate went wild. Then, towards the end of 1929 came the sudden crash, and the greatest depression ever known settled down over the free world. Millions of people were rendered destitute. Thousands committed suicide. Misgovernment was blamed for the economic upset which made paupers out of tens of millions of people, and trillionaires out of three hundred who were already millionaires.” (italics added)

Carr’s book predates Sutton’s 3-volume magna opus on western technology transfers to the Soviet Union. Stalin is still warm in his grave. A ghostly horror hangs over the Kremlin and all of Russia is spiraling deep into the hysterical numbing paralysis of Cold War militarization, a year before Khrushchev assumes power.

Guy Carr tells it the way no establishment journalist dare, and he writes, “In 1925 Stalin started his five-year industrial plans to increase the so-called Sovietized countries internal recovery. The plan was to exploit the natural resources, manufacture raw materials into useful commodities, and modernize industrial and agricultural machinery. This vast Five Year Plan was financed by loans from the international bankers. This programme, when added to the development of the Russian and German war potential under the Abmachungen (agreements) … gave a great boost to Soviet economy. The fact that the Rulers of Russia could use millions of men and women as slaves gave those who enslaved them an additional advantage over nations which employ paid labour, and maintain a high standard of living. The next move was the collectivization of farms. For centuries the serfs in Russia had been little better than slaves of the landed proprietors. Lenin had won their support by promising them even greater concessions than they had been granted under the benevolent rule of Premier Peter Arkadyevich Stolypin from 1906 to 1914, when over 2,000,000 peasant families seceded from the village mir and became individual land owners. By January 1st, 1916, the number had increased to 6,200,000 families. But, in order to secure the loans they had made for the Abmachungen and industrial development programmes, the international bankers insisted that they control the import and export trade of the Sovietized nations.” (italics added)

A generation has passed since the Holodomor climaxing in the brutality of the World War but Carr is unwilling to let it pass into that Orwellian “memory hole” sucking up complacent two- car and home in the suburbs American culture. “They also demanded,” Carr writes, “the collectivization of farms as the only means to obtain greatly increased agricultural production. History records what happened when Stalin enforced the edicts. He has always been blamed personally for the inhuman atrocities which made the peasants comply with the laws. Many versions of what happened have been given. The truth, as I reported it to American newspapers in 1930, has never been published to date. It is acknowledged that over 5,000,000 peasants were executed, or systematically starved to death, because they refused to obey, or tried to evade the edicts. Over 5,000,000 more were sent to forced labour in Siberia. What is not generally known is the fact that the grain which was confiscated from the Russian farmers was pooled together with a vast quantity of grain purchased by the agents of the international bankers in other countries except Canada and the United States. In addition to this corner on grain the international bankers bought up huge supplies of processed and frozen meats in the Argentine and other meat producing countries. Canada and the United States could not find a market for their cattle, or their grain.”

Carr elaborates further how the Versailles lawyer and banker clique of the Consortium negotiate the postwar world of the cataclysmic rise and fall of the twenties: “During the period 1920-1929 the international bankers subsidized shipping in most countries except Britain, Canada, and the United States. As the result of this commercial piracy, it became impossible for ships owned in Britain, Canada, and the United States to compete with ships owned by other countries. Thousands of ships were tied up idle in their home ports. Export trade fell off to an all-time low. The falling off of exports from the allied nations was accompanied by increasing the importation of cheaply manufactured goods from Germany, Japan, and central European countries. To enjoy reasonable prosperity, five out of every eight wage-earners in Canada must obtain their pay directly or indirectly as a result of the export trade. When the export trade falls off a recession immediately follows, due to loss of purchasing power among five-eighths of the population. This immediately affects those who earn their living by rendering services of one kind or another. If the export trade remains down, then the recession deteriorates into a depression.”

And what about all that talk about Russian “dumping” of grain stocks on the world wheat market? Carr explained, “To make absolutely sure that the skids were completely knocked from under the economic structures of allied countries, the men who had cornered grain and meats began to dump their supplies on the markets of the world at prices below the cost of production in Canada, America and Australia. This action brought about a situation in which the granaries of the countries allied together in World War I were bursting with grain they couldn’t sell, while the people of other countries were starving to death for want of bread and meat. Britain needs to earn £85,000,000 a year from her ocean services in order to offset her unfavourable annual trade balance each year. The British economy was given a severe jolt when unfair competition made it impossible for her to earn this money. The British people were forced to buy their bread and meat in the cheapest markets. This artificially produce d economic mess-up was used by the men who master-mind international intrigue to cause grave misunderstanding between different units of the British Commonwealth of Nations and thus weaken the bonds of Empire.”

Carr added, “As the result of this economic war, the shipping, industrial, and agricultural activities of the allied or capitalistic countries were brought to a virtual standstill, while the Soviet States and the Axis Powers worked at full capacity. Once again it must be remembered that the men who plot and plan the World Revolutionary Movement always work on the fundamental principle that wars end depressions and pave the way for revolutionary action in countries that still remain to be subjugated. This being a fact, it was essential to the furthering of their Long Range Plans to arrange international affairs so they could bring about World War II when they wished to do so …”

By 1931 the British have become the principal buyers of Russian-Ukrainian wheat. Williams continues on the trail, writing, “One British expert wrote in a confidential memorandum that ‘There is … no doubt that any reasonable forecast of the competition which must be expected from Russia (from wheat exports) would be of immense value to all British wheat producers and we are desperately in the dark still’.” (A. J. Williams, 194-5, footnote 214, 35. S.L. Holmes on Cairns’ report ‘Russian Wheat’, Feb. 7, 1931, DO35/196/6 9PRO); Williams adds, “The American Department of Commerce was convinced that there would be no flood of Soviet wheat exports until 1931, at least. Williams points to correspondence Klein to George Akerson, Hoover’s secretary, Feb. 19, 1930, Hoover Presidential Papers, Box no. 993)

The Canadian Premier R.B.J. Bennett, in office since 1920 pushed for Canadian exports over Russian, especially when he feared Russian wheat flooding the world market. Nor did he ignore the threat of furs, timber, coal, asbestos. By mid-1931 Jimmy. Thomas, MP since 1910, expelled from the Labour Party when he joined Ramsay MacDonald’s coalition government, learns “that Russia was now the premier supplier of British wheat imports (each bushel a potential supplanter of a Canadian bushel), and that such imports were up from nothing in 1929 to over five million bushels in the first three months of 1931 alone.” (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 195)

Canada was a primary export market along with the US and Britain. Bennett raised tariffs on items over 100 percent; at the 1930 Imperial Conference in London he urges MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas, (Secretary of State for the Dominions) follow in step. They refused. Williams writes, “His problem was that he had to persuade the British because Britain was the world’s greatest importer of wheat (190,000,000 bushels in 1928), of which 50 percent came from Canada and Australia. Canada had about 250 million bushels to export every year in the late 1920s, so a loss of the British market to, say, Russia, would be disastrous.” By 1931 Bennett considered a general trade embargo on Russia banning the five staple Russian products for export – timber, furs, coal, asbestos and grain. If Bennett could have his way, Canadian, US and British trade restrictions might even topple the Bolshevik regime, according to Williams who noted, however, “the key problem for Bennett had been, and was to remain, the prospect of Russian wheat exports.” (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 194)

Williams argues against Bennett’s cause for alarm of a Russian flood of exports undermining the Canadian economy. That just wasn’t going to happen. “Until early 1931 the answer must be that such evidence was lacking,” the professor Williams observes. “One British expert wrote in a confidential memorandum that ‘There is … no doubt that any reasonable forecast of the competition which must be expected from Russia (from wheat exports) would be of immense value to all British wheat producers and we are desperately in the dark still.” Internal FO memos (Clark and Thomas) mid-1931 indicate that Russia had become Britain’s chief supplier of wheat imports, supplanting Canadian exports and now “were up from nothing in 1929 to over five million bushels in the first three months of 1931 alone”. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 195)

Prof. Williams’ elaborated his basic tenet summed up here quoting from his chapter “Anglo-Soviet relations 1929-35”: “The peak of trade with the West came during the first Five Year Plan, between 1928 and 1931, attaining an import peak of $569 million in 1931, then declining rapidly to $120 million by 1936, although this was during a period of an immense decline of global trade due to the Depression … the Soviet Union aimed at autocracy and as it developed its own industries progressively shut out trade to reduce reliance on imports. Total Soviet trade was negligible in 1922-9, built up quite rapidly to the 1931 summit and then crashed by 1935-6.”

Williams even goes so far as to divert the concealment and isolation of Soviet trade with the West due to “the ‘danger of contamination’ for the Soviets” driving them away from making “concessions throughout their short life (1923-30)”. Williams, however, does acknowledge that from 1921 to 1929 “172 concession agreements were signed, including those for technical assistance. It is said that 2.670 firms and individuals proposed concessions, of which only 6-7 per cent were accepted by Moscow. They were mainly in the areas of oil, mining, timber, paper, sugar, cement, phosphates, matches, and in the chemical and electro-technical industries, a list presented in 1922 at Genoa by the Soviet delegation. These concessions were always controversial in the West because they usually entailed Western companies restarting the businesses of Western companies that had been dispossessed after the Revolution… They never commanded more than 4 per cent (in 1928) of total Soviet trade before their wholesale dissolution in 1930 when the total monopoly of foreign trade was decreed in Moscow”. That is, excluding Hammer’s pencils and Harriman’s stake in manganese, or Britain’s Lena Goldfields… (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 10-1, 195)

Wheat expert Cairns went on to counter alarmist fears of excessive Russian wheat exports or dumping that otherwise would undermine Canada’s trade balance. Williams writes that the young scot Andrew Cairns’ Russian wheat reports strongly confirm that under the present circumstances “the Soviet Union could not possibly be a short-, medium- or even long-term threat to Canadian exporters of grain, except at the margin. In short, there ‘are many reasons for being optimistic about the probable effects of Russian competition on the position of primary producers in the Dominions’.”

For Cairns, collectivization posed no threat under the current Soviet system of the Kolkhozes and Sovhoses. H. D. Henderson, senior ranking official of the FO, writes British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald confirming MacDonald had “definitely” read the Cairn reports from the FO describing them as “an interesting if squalid story of black bread, hunger, tears and death”. Britain sought large quantities of wheat but Bennett learns that the Russians are unable to supply it. Williams does refer to the famine, writing “the Russians did continue to export sufficient to starve their peasants further, and to make it impossible radically to decrease Canadian stocks, which continued to overhang the market until well into the late 1930s. Russia’s strategy hinged, in the area of wheat, on Russia’s power to impede wheat producer cartel action by the ‘big four’ – Canada, the United States, Australia, and Argentina. Cairns revelations therefore did little to objectively lighten Bennett’s load.” (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 195-6)

In a private conversation between Pierre de Boal* US Charge in Ottawa, and Bennett, in February 1933, the Canadian PM confides that he might lean in the direction that would “free himself from the criticism that his economic policy in embracing the Empire had isolated Canada from its natural market, the United States.” But change with Ottawa comes too slow to help the Ukrainians if it comes at all. In 1931, Gordon Stewart writes in Canada and the End of Empire (2005) in respect to foreign trade and lower tariffs Benjamin Wallace in the Office of the Economic adviser “excoriated the traditional American approach since the end of the Civil War of building up high tariff walls.”

This is an approach, Wallace wrote, that “simply forced Canada into imperial and nationalist alternatives.” Wallace insists “the greatest error in the commercial policy of the United States has been the treatment of Canada. Canadians are of the same language and stock, and have essentially the same standard of living and the same political outlook and ideals as Americans. The boundary between us is largely artificial and Canada is so divided geographically that the natural trade routes are North and South. There is no military, or political, or economic reason for not treating Canada economically as part of the United States. …if anything is ever to be done to initiate closer trade relations between the US and Canada it should be done before June 1932 when the next imperial conference meets.” That change was in the air and not overlooked by Bullitt who, as a delegate to the 1933 London Economic Conference advised Roosevelt “via Canada we might make a hole in the Ottawa agreements”.

Back in Parliament when the Liberals in MacDonald’s government dissent over Conservative pressures to reduce Soviet imports, they bolt claiming the denigration of Russian trade is pandering to the “height of folly”. The senior dons of the British FO are out on thin ice once news from Ottawa leaks. MacDonald fretted over Stalin’s reaction, and appeal to Sir John Simon and Lord William Strang to stroke the Kremlin’s back. On October 6, 1932 Simon meets veteran Bolshevik Commissar Sokolnikov soon recalled to Moscow to explain the Ottawa betrayal. Sokolnikov ask for clarification of the Ottawa trade decision. Williams writes, “Simon lied and told him that no decision had been made but that an improvement in trade figures (which had already happened in fact) would be welcome and that a settlement of the dispute over the Lena Goldfields would help.” That double-cross sets the stage for Sir Edmund Ovey’s arrival in Moscow and his subsequent verbal lashing by the wit of Litvinov. Turn-about is fair play. The Bolsheviks thrive at that game.

Mid-October just six days after MacDonald’s Cabinet agrees formally to renounce the Ottawa trade agreement Litvinov insists that Ovey explain what went wrong since Solkolnikov’s assurances. Litvinov accuses London, Ovey writes in his report to the FO, calling the setback a “victory of an extremist anti-Russian group in the United Kingdom” against the position put forward by the Secretary for the Dominions (Thomas) of the Russian clause in the Ottawa Agreement. Litvinov leaves “depressed and pessimistic” and suspected, he tells Sir Edmund, “that some secret bargain was made with Canada that Anglo-Russian agreement should in any case be terminated.” He throws down the American card that if Roosevelt should replace Hoover, Litvinov fears another snag in relations.

An adviser of Stalin consoles Ovey not to worry. Lord Strang dismisses fears of retaliation over Article XXI convinced of Britain’s superior status as a necessary market for Russian goods. (A. J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 203, ftn. 61-3)

 

Home for the July 4th Independence Day weekend, Stimson relaxed on Sunday at Highhold, and after leaving the Bronson Winthrop house rode down to find Mable at the Beach Club. He’s pleased with his chat with his young PR whip Arthur Page all bullish about the economy turning the corner to recovery. “He sees a slight pick-up in commodity prices …”, Stimson notes. The Democratic Convention is the hot news now. “They finally nominated Franklin Roosevelt,” Stimson wrote in his diary, “by a deal engineered evidently by McAdoo and Hearst under which the Garner delegation came over to Franklin Roosevelt and afterwards Garner was nominated for Vice President. Franklin Roosevelt then flew over from Albany to Chicago and made a speech of acceptance to the whole Convention before it had dispersed. This made a great hit with the newspapermen. The speech was pretty good and the idea was pretty good. … it was a good thing to catch the eye. Everybody is beginning to think that Roosevelt is going to put up a hard fight. I have thought so from the beginning.”

Twenty-three years have passed since Stimson lost against Teddy Roosevelt in his bid for Governor of New York in 1910. Stimson’s career in politics came crashing down under the same Democratic landslide that installed a cherry-face 28-year-old freshman politician and lawyer in the New York state legislature – Franklin D. Roosevelt. He wouldn’t know it at the time but for Stimson the loss to TR was something between destiny and mystery written in the stars. Stimson was the man who kept the secrets sitting side to side to more presidents than any man in US history.

After the Democratic Convention Col. House makes his move. A week later back in the office Monday Allen Klots and Shepard Morgan of Chase National deliver Stimson “an astounding proposal” from House. Col. House says he wants “to take the whole question of debts and reparations out of politics by an agreement between Roosevelt and Hoover”. Stimson is told House has agreed to press Roosevelt to accept and is going to see him this Thursday at his Beverly home. House wants Hoover’s stand on it before the meeting. Stimson is delighted. He talks to Hoover and that evening Stimson dines with Klots and Bundy at Woodley.

“We were all of the opinion,” Stimson pens in his diary, ‘that if offered a possible chance of a very great stroke for the benefit of the world and for the benefit of Mr. Hoover in particular by which we might get the whole thing out of politics provided somebody is willing to be big and take chances”. That night Stimson passes the deal over to Ogden Mills and “begged for his help”. Hoover called Stimson in the morning telling him “that we were getting in very bad with the people of the United States”. Hoover is upset over new press attacks by Hearst, and, in particular, Stimson’s work “to offset the work of the British Treasury”. Stimson shrugs, clears himself to Hoover and reporters that day in the regular press conference showing his own press release of last June 8.

The big obstacle now is the President. Stimson feels Hoover is a beaten man and completely “tired out”. He worries Hoover “has lost perspective”. He observes that “nobody can do otherwise who stays in Washington during these past three years without any break as he has”. Three years of the Great Depression since the October 1929 crash of Wall Street. There is no empathy or sympathy here. Stimson is preoccupied with the Japanese militarists in Manchuria. On July 20 Stimson meets with his predecessor Frank Kellogg back from the Geneva Disarmament talks. Stimson notes that his predecessor Kellogg has “no use for Sir John Simon”. Kellogg and Simon had talked tough about reductions, but Stimson writes, “Of course he indicated that there was going to be no reduction at all in naval affairs until 1938, or somewhere thereabout. As Kellogg put it, ‘How can we expect the other people to disarm if the British took that attitude’.” The disarmament talks are reached a state of near total collapse as the world powers slide closer to war. Stimson is troubled, unsure how to handle the British. He writes, “It is evident that we are going to be up against the issue this fall. I am trying to think out ahead what to do.” He assigns Hornbeck the task of sorting it out in a speech for the Secretary “really for the purpose of laying the foundation stone for the whole policy by giving my views of the Kellogg Pact and the importance of the concerted action of the nations under it… ” Late July Stimson understands that it’s clear with Seymour Parker Gilbert (1892-38) that the conference intends to keep off its agenda “discussions of reparations and debts and tariff schedules or rates”. For the record Stimson writes in his diary, “History will not know that we tried to invoke it and were blocked by the British…”

Kellogg and Stimson lunch with Hoover at the White House. They advise the President to leave Washington and to “go out West” and campaign. Less than four months remain before the election.

In the Far East all signs point towards world war. The Secretary makes another entry into his diary: “August 10. Meet with Japanese ambassador leaving Washington and “came to say good-bye”. Stimson tells him the Japanese militarist government has crossed the line and should not be mistaken that they are “just at the beginning of their trouble; that the 30,000,000 Chinese in Manchuria were going to make a long fight, and that their Japanese conduct was going to lead to years of anarchy and war probably in Manchuria, perhaps a World War; that it looked very bad.” (HLS Diary, re. Seymour P. Gilbert, July 27, 1932)

While Stimson appears weak and unable to do much to restrain the Japanese military penetration in Manchuria he shows little more than indifference towards Stalin and Soviet Russia where this fatal summer in July 1932 a more deadly scenario of power politics intensifies repression on the Ukrainians. Fields with late sowing go unharvested, once healthy and able peasants and their families and entire villages starve. Famine is widespread. The Consortium’s absolute dictator loses all patience and again forces the Ukraine to its knees. Even the conquering Mongols had never been so ruthlessly determined to exterminate their foreign enemy.

Bullitt travels to Moscow arriving there May 21. With him is J. L. Curtis, assistant vice-president of National City and Hartford Beaumont of Shearman & Sterling. He’s immediately met by George I. Andreytchine, the friendly Soviet vice commissar of Mosamtorg (Amtorg in Moscow), and a member of the Communist Party who had first met Bullitt in America when he worked with the radical labour leader Bill Haywood’s International Workers of the World (IWW). Andreytchine, in fact, had been condemned with Haywood as one of his 14 “chief aids”, fined for anti-war protests against the First World War and sentenced 20 years in prison by a federal judge in the nationally famous IWW trial in Chicago. “Big Bill” Haywood (1869-28) moved to Moscow in the early 1920s and attended Reed’s funeral ceremonies. Haywood stays on and dies there disillusioned and embittered.

Andreytchine is still a bonefide member of the Communist Party but that won’t protect him or anyone these days. Stalin purges the Party constantly. Andreytchine and Bullitt became fast friends. Both enjoys each other’s comraderie, especially Anrdreychine who feels a special comfort next to his important American guest. As a child Andreytchine had grown up in Bulgaria where the King took a special fondness to him and paid his education expenses. He warns Bullitt about the local criminal elements, the CHEKA-GPU-NKVD secret police, and other querks of the new Soviet mentality. In the Bullitt Papers collection at the Yale Archives there is a document probably dating to this time titled “SUGGESTIONS RE: THE DESIRABILITY OF SENDING AN OFFICIAL AMERICAN COMMISSION TO THE U.S.S.R”. This document is about collectivization and the peasant revolt movement; there is a folder labeled “402” identified only as “Spec Asst to the Sec of State – Negotiations with the US, 1932, MEMORANDUM OF CERTAIN CONVERSATIONS IN RUSSIA REGARDING DEBTS, RECOGNITION. MAY – JULY, 1932”. It is a curious document oddly overlooked by Bullitt historians. (W. C. Bullitt Papers, Yale Univ. Library Archives, folder 402, Box 110)

Bullitt wants to improve relations and trade with the Soviets, and more importantly become an accepted player with the Consortium gang. The peasant farmers and their families are readily forsaken to the priority of debt recovery through gold and grain sales existing in one and separate worlds divided by war greed politics and persecution of the Slavic Ukrainian population of men, women and children. Now only life and death divide them and keeps their separateness apart in a once united world. Ultimately the terror sweeps them out of sight. It is worthy to note that there is virtually nothing to show that any of these bank men, including Bullitt were even the slightest concerned with the loss of human life as a result of oppression and famine in the Ukraine.

As it is, by summer 1932 Bullitt finds himself in the maze of key banking insiders on the Kremlin scene playing a part trying to settle millions of dollars of privately-held debt under the stigma of a national Genocide. It’s a pathetic arrangement for him but this is his destiny. Fate has thrown him another card so what can he do? He has a daughter back home and his former wife is shooting dope and getting drunk in Paris. Both of them live under the shadow of Jack Reed. Now he is in the thick of a Genocide and trying to cut a deal with the Bols and National City. Among the people Bullitt hangs out with in Moscow in May and June are his friends Lyons, Duranty, Fischer of the foreign press pool. To be sure Bullitt came prepared with an extensive list of political and social contacts of Moscow’s elite diplomatic circuit with links to the Consortium, the ARCC in the CFR and men of National City. It was the way he got around and he did what he had to do.

Bullitt meets Mikhail Osipovich Reikhel, Chief of the Foreign Currency Department in charge of International Settlements and Vice Commissar for Finance. Bullitt notes that a National City banker (no names) at this time travels to the Cossack region of Dnieprostroi to inspect progress on the huge hydroelectric project and to Kharkov, capital of Soviet Ukraine. There the banker observed thousands of laborers in work camps. Bullitt wrote, “Meshlauk wanted me to see these places, and I wanted to see Col. Cooper’s brother, Dexter Cooper, at Dnieprostroi. He has influence with Winter, an engineer made Vice-Commissar for Heavy Industry with Piatakov, ‘and I am told it is the first time a professional man has been made a Commissar’.

Although Bullitt during this crucial period of intense Soviet preparations to deal with the grain crisis, he ignores it. There is no evidence that Bullitt gave it any serious attention. He most probably called upon his friend Duranty and others of the foreign press to get the latest dope on the Soviets. Duranty is writing his series on Stalin and the US for The New York Times that gets him the Pulitzer. Bullitt keeps his head down. He’s not here to grab headlines.

Molotov and Kaganovich harangue the Ukrainian Communist Party leaders assembled at the Third All-Ukrainian Conference. It is to be the deciding blow. Ukrainian Party leaders Skrypnyk, Kosior, Chubar appeal that the spring sowing campaign had failed to produce the grain harvest projected by leaders higher up in the Party hierarchy. The grain targets are excessive, they argued. Chubar, head of the Ukrainian Soviet Government was reported by Pravda, July 7 as blaming unrealistic quotas imposed on the kolkhozes in their haste to concede to Party discipline. It was a suicidal plea. “It is wrong,” he was reported to have said, “to accept an order regardless of its practicability, and then try to distort Party policy, to destroy revolutionary law and order, to ruin the economy of the Kolkhozes, justifying all this by orders from above.”

There is madness everywhere. The communist system has gone berserk. They argue. Even whispering halls have ears! Suspicion and fear thicken the atmosphere with charges and accusation. The Party is questioned. They have written their own death sentence. How dare he challenge the Party! Saboteur! Wrecker! What did it matter that conditions were brutal in the villages throughout the vast and once fertile plains of the Ukraine. In spite of that Stalin orders a delivery target of 7.7 million tons.

A week after the conference, Pravda reports Molotov’s counterattack on “anti-Bolshevik” critics of the procurement policy. “There would be no concessions or vacillations,” Molotov vowed, “in the problem of fulfillment of the task set by the Party and the Soviet government.” No concessions! Shock brigades to the countryside! Soviet justice must prevail against the Ukrainian usurpers! Stalin’s order is reduced to 6.6 million tons but it is never collected. Fields and huts are stripped bare. So is the political will of leaders who yet dare to resist Stalin’s death-grip on the Party. Apparently an incident provoking a showdown at the highest level of Party leadership fails to find sufficient clarity in the dispatches of the foreign embassies to foresee the elements combining to bring upon them the perfect storm of terror and famine.

This bellwether summer 1932 Martemyan N. Ryutin (1890-37) and a group of minor party officials including other followers of Bukharin who have opposed collectivization challenge Stalin by signing their “Appeal to All Members of the All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)”. It’s a letter of inflammatory protest against Stalin’s brutality and sent to the Central Committee in the autumn 1932. A former Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee Ryutin is accused of a plot against Stalin. This is very bad for Ryutin; he had already been arrested once, September 1930 but Stalin reconsidered and the OGPU (Security Police) Collegium is instructed not to condemn him as an “enemy of the people” but to let him go, cleared of any criminal intent! Ryutin is given a warning only this time he can feel the noose tightening around his neck.

So he swings the helm to a different tack. But this time his paper, known as “the Ryutin Platform” proposes an economic retreat, a reduction of investment in heavy industry and the liberation of the peasants that would allow them to leave the collective and state farms. Everyone knows he’s risking his life but Ryutin’s courageous indignation is nothing less than heroic. What else could he do? Russia is going over the cliff. Since 1930 the Gulag has become a way of life and death for Great Soviet Experiment. How is the Party going to survive?

They have had enough of Stalin! They issue a revolutionary call to the nation. The terror must end! They really put their necks out this time. The “Ryutin Platform” condemns Stalin as “the evil genius of the Russian Revolution”. They point to the terror, famine and lawlessness existing both in the party and in the countryside, the collapse of genuine planning. They accuse the Party for supporting an official press reduced “in the hands of Stalin and his clique to a monstrous factory of lies… Stalin and his clique will not and cannot voluntarily give up their position, so they must be removed by force”.

(And the above extracts are only a few on the first 25 pages of this 650 page book!)